In 2013, the Boston Celtics sent Kevin Garnett, Paul Pierce, Jason Terry, D.J. White, a late 2017 first-round pick and a 2017 second-round pick to the Brooklyn Nets for Keith Bogans, MarShon Brooks, Kris Humphries, Kris Joseph, Gerald Wallace, three first-round picks and a first-round pick swap.

At the time, Sports Illustrated's Ben Golliver gave the Nets a B+ for the deal. In the New York Times, Howard Beck wrote that the trade would give the Nets a new attitude, which was their "greatest need of all." However, he also cautioned that there was real risk in surrendering those picks.

Pierce spent one season with the Nets, his age-36 campaign. Brooklyn went 44-38 in the regular season and got eliminated by the Miami Heat in the second round of the playoffs in five games.

The following offseason, Pierce signed as a free agent with the Washington Wizards. Garnett, who was a year older, was traded to the Minnesota Timberwolves during the 2014-15 campaign.

The Nets never sniffed contention with the Celtics legends, and the picks they surrendered to get Pierce and Garnett did indeed come back to haunt them. Although shrewd management from general manager Sean Marks eventually put them back on a path toward relevance, the lingering fallout from the Boston deal wasn't easy to get over.

That particular trade is an extreme example, but lopsided results have emerged from plenty of swaps over the years. There probably isn't a Nets-Celtics debacle lurking in the list of 2020 trades (though one deal did include that kind of draft capital), but the following few could look rough in a few years.

Houston's Gamble on Micro-Ball

We have to travel back to February of this year for our first potentially lopsided deal.

In a four-team megatrade, the Houston Rockets sent out Clint Capela, Gerald Green, Nene and a 2020 first-round pick that wound up being used to select Zeke Nnaji. They got back Jordan Bell, Robert Covington and a 2024 second-round pick.

The move was defendable at the time. Having a non-shooter like Capela in a lineup with Russell Westbrook cramped spacing too much. (The acquisition of Russ was the real gamble that started this chain of events.) And Houston outscored opponents by 5.3 points per 100 possessions when Covington shared the floor with Westbrook.

The Rockets now have almost nothing to show for this deal, though.

Bell and Covington are both gone. Trevor Ariza was briefly in Covington's place before the Rockets redirected him to the Detroit Pistons. Christian Wood, acquired in that sign-and-trade, should fi Houston's current backcourt better than Capela did, but his arrival almost certainly wasn't contemplated in relation to this deal.

It remains to be seen what Capela will do with the Atlanta Hawks, but it's safe to assume he'll get plenty of dunks as a rim-roller for Trae Young. The synergy between those two could be an awful lot like what existed between Capela and Harden.

During Capela's five seasons as a rotation player, Houston's net rating was 2.4 points better when he was on the floor with Harden than it was when Harden was on the floor without him. If that kind of chemistry develops in Atlanta, it'll be tough for a second-round pick who may not even have his driver's license yet to be considered the winning side of this deal.

The Rockets can say that using Ariza's contract to help land Wood makes it all worthwhile, but they could've found other cap workarounds to push that sign-and-trade through.

Celtics Lose Hayward for Nothing... For Now

When Gordon Hayward signed a four-year, $127.8 million deal with the Boston Celtics in 2017, he surely didn't imagine being the team's fourth option by the third season of that contract.

A gruesome broken leg in his first regular-season game with the Celtics quickly derailed his time in Boston. Other injuries had their say as well. And by the time the 2019-20 campaign was over, Hayward was ready to opt out of the final season on the contract.

At that point, Boston entered into sign-and-trade negotiations to make sure it didn't lose a max player for nothing. Hayward's hometown team was reportedly in on those negotiations.

According to J. Michael of the Indianapolis Star, the Indianapolis Pacers offered "Myles Turner, a first-round pick and a rotation player" for Hayward. However, the Celtics reportedly insisted on T.J. Warren or Victor Oladipo being part of the deal instead of Doug McDermott, according to the Boston Globe's Gary Washburn.

With Boston's heels dug in, Hayward instead agreed to a four-year, $120 million deal with the Charlotte Hornets. The Celtics managed to turn it into a sign-and-trade at the 11th hour, which resulted in the loss of two second-round picks and the addition of a conditional second and a massive trade exception.

If Boston eventually uses that $28.5 million exception to absorb the contracts of one or two decent players, this deal will look a lot better. For now, passing on Turner and McDermott for what might turn out to be nothing seems like a mistake.

The Celtics can easily justify the non-move by saying they weren't high on Turner and that they weren't impressed with his trade value when discussing him with other teams. That all may be true, but Boston was comfortably better with Hayward on the floor this season. Losing him for nothing (for now) is far from ideal. And the potential replacements made sense on paper.

Turner isn't a low-post bruiser, but he would've made the Celtics bigger. His ability to shoot threes also would've kept the lane more clear for drives from Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown than Tristan Thompson (who Boston eventually signed) does.

McDermott isn't Warren, but why would the Celtics need Warren? Tatum, Brown and Kemba Walker will soak up most of their offensive possessions either way. A floor spacer who doesn't demand a ton of touches would've fit better. Instead, Boston got a decent but aging backup point guard in Jeff Teague.

Again, this all comes with a massive caveat. The Celtics might eventually move the needle with that trade exception. And it isn't like Hayward's presence in Charlotte guarantees contention. If we assume he provides anything there, though, the Hornets have a good chance of winning this deal.

Pistons Ditch Christian Wood for Nuggets Backups

Last season, Wood totaled 4.6 wins over replacement player (value over replacement player times 2.7) in only 1,325 minutes for the Pistons. He was tied for 50th leaguewide in the metric despite not having a role that matched his talent level till February.

Instead of re-signing the breakout stretch big who averaged 22.6 points, 10.9 rebounds, 1.5 threes and 1.5 blocks per 75 possessions with an astronomical true shooting percentage, Detroit orchestrated a sign-and-trade that sent him to Houston.

The Rockets received Wood, who signed a three-year, $41 million deal, a protected future first-round pick and a 2021 second-round pick. Detroit received the No. 16 overall pick (Isaiah Stewart), a future second-round pick, cash considerations and Ariza.

As if that alone doesn't sound underwhelming enough (with apologies to the unproven Stewart), Detroit then spent nearly $85 million dollars on the Denver Nuggets' reserve bigs. Mason Plumlee signed a three-year, $24.7 million contract, while Jerami Grant landed a hefty three-year, $60 million deal.

Remember those 4.6 wins over replacement player? Grant, Plumlee, Jahlil Okafor (who also signed with the Pistons) and Blake Griffin (still in Detroit) combined for 4.6 in 3,928 minutes.

Let's just focus on Wood and Grant for a moment. Though they weren't traded for each other, the money that Detroit could've spent to re-sign Wood went to Grant (and then some). The latter may have slightly more positional versatility, but his production was a drop in the bucket compared to the former's.

Few blind polls have yielded as lopsided a result as this one. And even if we tip the scales of this sign-and-trade by allowing Detroit to count its free-agent signings, the Rockets are likely to win this deal.

Bucks Go All-In on Jrue Holiday

It's easy to see why the Milwaukee Bucks broke the bank for Jrue Holiday, especially when it looked like Bogdan Bogdanovic might be on the way as well.

He's bigger than Eric Bledsoe, which makes him a more switchable, versatile defender. More importantly, he feels like a safer bet in the playoffs. His career postseason box plus/minus is 4.3, compared to Bledsoe's 0.8 (a number that has declined dramatically since he joined the Bucks).

There's also reason to believe Holiday's below-average scoring efficiency will improve once he's the third option in lineups with Giannis and Khris Middleton. With all the defensive attention those two command, Holiday should have more space to operate on plenty of catches.

The best possible version of this deal includes all of the above happening. Holiday's size gives Milwaukee an even sturdier defense. His shooting suddenly becomes an asset. And in the playoffs, where the Bucks have yet to live up to their regular-season performances during the Giannis era, Milwaukee doesn't get outperformed at the point guard spot.

Say that doesn't happen, though. Or, at least, assume it doesn't happen to the degree necessary to win a championship.

The Bucks gave up three first-rounders and two first-round pick swaps for a player who made one All-Star team back in 2013. They gave up their starting point guard and one of the best shooters in the NBA, George Hill, for a player who's hit 34.1 percent of his threes over the last five seasons.

An apples-to-apples comparison probably isn't fair, given the context of their production, but Bledsoe's numbers from last season fared better than Holiday's in a blind poll. Ditto for Hill's in comparison to his replacement, D.J. Augustin.

This is an astronomical price to pay for a non-sure thing. It might be what it costs to stay in contention, though.

If Giannis signs his supermax extension (which still hasn't happened yet), this deal may be a little easier to justify. The doomsday scenario is Antetokounmpo leaving, Holiday declining his 2021-22 player option and testing free agency, and those future picks sitting in the Pelicans' asset cupboard.

In reality, the result of this deal probably lies somewhere between the two extremes described above. Even there, the Bucks may have overpaid.