Just when we thought we had all of the answers, the Toronto Raptors changed the questions. 

A similar line was made famous by WWE Hall of Famer "Rowdy" Roddy Piper—a professional wrestler notorious for his brash arrogance and unparalleled self-confidence, despite coming out on the losing end more often than not. 

The Raptors essentially had a Piper-esque 2014-15 season. Instead of articulating into a microphone how incredible they were and boosting their egos through wordplay, the team displayed its smugness through a flawed brand of basketball that desperately needed fine-tuning but never received it. 

Beginning the year with a stellar 24-8 record was both a blessing and a curse. The Raptors caught opposing teams off guard, utilizing a chemistry that carried over from the final months of the 2013-14 season in a post-Rudy Gay world. While a number of teams tried to incorporate new pieces and formulate identities, Toronto already had a clear understanding of what it was capable of achieving early on.

A home-heavy schedule that featured just four road games through Nov. 24 was also a huge benefit. 

That good fortune didn't last, though, as the rest of the NBA eventually figured out Toronto wasn't as good as its record indicated. Injuries to Kyle Lowry and DeMar DeRozan factored in, but it was the Raptors' defensive decline and uninspired offensive schemes that hurt the most.

A 13-16 record following the All-Star break killed all momentum, resulting in an embarrassing four-game series sweep at the hands of the Washington Wizards in the playoffs. Winning a franchise-best 49 games became a buried landmark, overshadowed by a devastating first-round trouncing. 

So what did we learn about the Raptors? Just that the truth—in more ways than one—hurts.

Isolation Basketball Isn't a Championship Formula

Don't let the Raptors' 108.1 offensive rating (third) fool you into believing that scoring came easy. It was a difficult process made harder by an isolation-heavy game plan that catered to the strengths of the players. 

“We became a high-efficiency offensive team, how I don’t know, because playing that up-and-down, quick shots basketball is not conducive to championship basketball,” said head coach Dwane Casey during his end-of-season media availability, via Ryan Wolstat of the Toronto Sun. 

“We had an identity playing that way, we were winning, but in the back of my mind I knew it wasn’t going to be successful."

DeRozan agrees with Casey's sentiment, recognizing that the team works more efficiently when the ball is moving and everyone is involved, per Wolstat:

We had a lot of great games where we shared the ball. I just think we had our moments where we got stagnant and we settled a lot. But I think overall, we’re still great at sharing the ball, we’ve just got to understand we can’t settle for jump shots all the time or fast breaks. Be more of a one, two, three option team instead of just going to the first option and shoot. 

He should heed his own advice, though. DeRozan, along with Lou Williams, ranked as two of the NBA's highest-frequency isolation players.

It's hard to blame Williams for being the trigger-happy gunslinger he was. Casey made little effort in preventing the newly crowned NBA Sixth Man of the Year from making the decisions he did. Williams had a full-fledged license to shoot and took full advantage of it. 

This was especially true during end-of-quarter scenarios. Williams would constantly run down the game clock and heave up shots from wherever he was on the floor with reckless abandon. 

DeRozan's growth as a ball-handler led to him to challenging his defender at a higher rate, although that didn't always result in looks around the rim. He remains madly infatuated with an unreliable mid-range jumper that cut into his primal strength: creating contact and getting to the charity stripe (7.2 attempts, fifth).

The onus is on Casey to get his players moving past their bad habits and to start sharing the ball in perfect harmony. The 20.7 assists (22nd) and 54.7 assist percentage (28th) are numbers that need to be addressed over the offseason.

Unfortunately, players like Williams and DeRozan may be so set in their ways that steering them away from frequent isolations could be one tall order. All is right when the two are faking defenders out of their sneakers and getting to the free-throw line, but when cold streaks occur, there's not a lot to smile about. 

The Future Isn't Now

Jonas Valanciunas is the right guy on the wrong team. Terrence Ross is the wrong guy on the wrong team in the wrong role. 

Their respective performances this past season left a lot to be desired. Neither player took significant strides in the right direction, leaving their long-term futures with the franchise up in the air.

It's difficult for a true center like Valanciunas to establish himself on offense when he's surrounded by perimeter players who need the ball in their hands to be effective. His usage percentage of 19.1 was fifth on the Raptors—right behind the four-man guard rotation of Lowry, DeRozan, Williams and Greivis Vasquez. 

As John Gaudes of Raptors HQ points out, some of Valanciunas' teammates have selfish tendencies—often overlooking the big man and whatever positioning he may have. In a matchup against the Houston Rockets, Valanciunas had an obvious size advantage against Trevor Ariza under the basket, yet DeRozan cleared out after an offensive rebound and didn't give him a touch.

Casey's reluctance to go big in close games has also hindered Valanciunas' development. Patrick Patterson, who can stretch the floor with his three-point shooting at the 4 spot, was Casey's favorite in the fourth quarter with an average of 8.6 minutes. Valanciunas, who only appeared in 57 fourth quarters out of 80 games played, averaged 5.1. 

Toronto was also 6.7 points better per 100 possessions with Valanciunas on the bench, giving Casey more of a reason to use a smaller lineup. 

With the center position slowly being phased out due to a quicker style of play, the Valanciunas of the world need to provide more value when they do see the floor, whether it be as a rim protector or beast on the glass. General manager Masai Ujiri notices the direction the league is heading in, yet he believes the Raptors can buck the trend and find success with an improving Valanciunas at the 5, via Eric Koreen of the National Post:

(He is) a huge part of our team. We can criticize Jonas all we want, and it’s a big discussion we’re going to have with coach and staff — how he was used and how he is used. Those guys are hard to find. You can scour … the world and try to find those — Jonas, or big guys like that. It also takes time. We understand that. But we feel he got better and he got better at rim protecting, his feet got a little bit better. He got a little more confident in the post. He got better rebounding defensively. I think it’s gradual with big guys. It takes time and he’s going to be a big part of our building. … Not every team is going to win playing smaller and faster. I think there’s still a lot of big guys in the NBA like himself that are successful and a lot of successful teams have played big.

The problem is that Casey now has enough of a track record with not using Valanciunas appropriately to believe that the third-year Lithuanian can't reach his full potential north of the border. 

Ross, on the other hand, dug his own grave by being a one-dimensional wing with plenty to offer as a three-point shooter, but not much elsewhere to bring to the table. 

The hope was that he would develop into the three-and-D player he was showing signs of being in 2013-14. While his outside shooting maintained some semblance of consistency, his defense did anything but. 

He lost all pep in his step, making himself invisible on a far-too-regular basis. Ross couldn't rebound, facilitate or be trusted to do anything more than knock down a three-pointer or two. 

It's not all his fault, though. He's playing out of position at small forward, having to defend bulkier 3s with his 195-pound frame. His ideal role would be as a shooting guard, but that spot is held down by DeRozan. 

That "excuse" shouldn't absolve Ross of any blame, though. His work ethic is constantly being brought into question, as too is his desire to be great. He has the athleticism and agility to be the three-and-D swingman the Raptors want him to be, yet everything isn't coming together at once.

“Terrence and Jonas, both are young guys and have a lot of work to do, physically, mentally, getting prepared for each and every night,” Casey said, per Wolstat. “To play at this level, you’ve got to be have razor-like focus. I don’t want to pooh-pooh how much they grew throughout the season because they still (helped Toronto win) 49 games, won the division but this level is a different level and all of us have to learn how to compete at this level."

Ujiri has the option to extend both Valanciunas and Ross as they enter the final years of their rookie contracts. While it's possible he looks past both of their flaws and seals their future as Raptors, such an investment may be too risky with their potential having yet to shine through and yield results.

Adversity Reveals All

To the credit of Ujiri, he allowed a core that came within an eyelash of the second round of the playoffs in 2013-14 more of an opportunity to continue what it started. 

Lowry re-signed on a four-year, $48 million contract, while Vasquez and Patterson each received new short-term deals. Even Casey—who wasn't even a Ujiri hire—got a three-year contract extension.

The Wizards series changed everything, though. It was rarely competitive as John Wall and company laid a beating on Toronto that very few people could have forecast. 

Paul Pierce told Jackie MacMullan of ESPNBoston.com prior to the start of the series that the Raptors don't "have the 'It' that makes you worried." Even after losing all three games during the regular season, the Wizards still entered the playoffs with zero fear of the Atlantic Division champions.

They had the psychological edge—if it hadn't already been secured from Pierce's comments—after taking Game 1 at the Air Canada Centre in a 93-86 victory. Returning three nights later and winning 117-106 in Game 2 was the final nail in Toronto's coffin. 

The Raptors didn't have the emotional grit to fight back. Any words of encouragement went in one ear and out the other. In the do-or-die Game 4, Toronto trailed by 16 after one quarter and 32 by the end of the third. 

“Yeah, yeah, I’ll say it: It was embarrassing,” said Patterson following the elimination game, per Eric Koreen of the National Post. “A horrific effort on our part."

“Something happened during the season that caused the change. I’m not exactly sure what the cause was, but the effect obviously was us losing games, going on a crazy losing streak and then non-success, horrible play in the playoffs. So I’m not exactly sure what the biggest difference was or what happened or why.”

The Raptors came crashing back down to earth during the second half of the season as reality slapped everyone in the face. The flame that ignited in December 2013 and was lit all the way until the 2015 NBA All-Star break had finally been snuffed out through prolonged losing and adversity.

All of the issues were finally coming to the forefront, whether it was the Raptors' lack of size in the frontcourt or Casey's questionable rotations—mainly involving Valanciunas and seldom-used James Johnson. 

But nothing changed. The Raptors didn't adapt. The trade deadline came and went. Even with Lowry sitting 12 games, Toronto stuck with what brought it to the dance and crossed its fingers that everything would work out on its own. Time heals all. 

It was naive to think that it would. The Raptors, frankly, got what was coming to them. 

Christopher Walder is a Featured Columnist for the Toronto Raptors at Bleacher Report. You can follow him on Twitter at @WalderSports.

All statistics are provided by NBA.com/stats and Basketball-Reference.com.